corporate business unit in Flexner v. Farson, 6 or, by later decision, at least to businesses quasi-corporate in form. 7 Since the state did not have the power to exclude the nonresident individual, reasoned the court in the Flexner case, the analogy to the implied consent theory failed; accordingly, service on the local agent of the nonresident partners was not binding on the partner who had not been personally served. Appearance or personal service was said to be required by the due process clause. 8 Subsequent decisions in several state courts follow the general doctrine of that case ;9 nevertheless, an occasional state court strains to justify the actual decision in the Flexner case on the rather dubious idea that the person who was served was not the agent of the defendants at the time of service. 10 The first inroads upon the doctrine of lexner v. Parson came in those cases which, however the court may have rationalized the result, can be categorized as cases where the state had a "high social interest" in the protection of its citizens from the dangers to which they were confronted by the nonresident individual's activities within the state. The three main activities of this class were: (1) driving an automobile on the state's highways; (2) selling securities within the state; (3) conducting operations within the state which were "fraught with danger." State statutes providing for substituted service (i.e., on some state official, usually the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles) on the nonresident motorists were accordingly upheld on the basis of the police power of the state to regulate public safety on the highways," bolstered by the argument, familiar in the case of the foreign corporation, that the state could exclude the noncitizen from using the highways. reasoned that since the state had treated such activity as "exceptional" and subject to special regulation, as shown by enactment of a Blue Sky law, the service on the agent of the nonresident was valid, even though made under a general statute relating to "doing business" on the part of nonresidents. The third exception, which can encompass more varied activities, is justified on the ground that the conduct of a "hazardous" business is subject to the "police power" of the state to enact laws for the reasonable protection of its citizens. Accordingly, it was held that the building of a levee was "fraught with danger" and as such the state had the power to provide for substituted service in a local suit against the nonresident contractor.' 4 Prior to the International Shoe case, 15 which affords a new means to uphold substituted service in local suits against nonresidents engaged in business within the state, there were only two jurisdictions willing to break away from the Flexner decision and say that simply to be conducting "business" (to be contrasted with the specific activities seen above), would be sufficient to make the nonresident amenable to suit by service on his agent. In finding a New York statute's constitutional, the New York court viewed as sufficient the test "whether the cause of action arises out of the conduct of business by the nonresident,' "17 and service on the managing agent of the nonresident owners of income-producing buildings was held binding on them in a suit by a plaintiff injured by a fire in the building. The same New York statute was upheld in a later case, 18 although it was found that the service was invalid, because made in a suit upon a cause of action not arising out of the conduct of local business. Pointing both to the reasonableness of the statute, and for good measure, to the police power concept as embracing "regulations designated to promote public convenience or the prosperity or welfare," the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-vania' 9 upheld substituted service under a Pennsylvania statute 20 permitting local suits against a nonresident "who engages in business" in that state. The utilization of this idea has been supported on the basis that, since the nonresident accepts the benefit of the protection of the laws of the state through his agent, he should be amenable to the jurisdiction of the forum, at least within a restricted range of actions.
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Although most of the jurisdictions had not so flatly disregarded the reasoning of Flexner v. Parson, it is interesting to note that a number of state legislatures either enacted statutes providing for substituted service of process on the nonresident individuals subsequently to that decision or simply left prior similar statutes unrepealed. The status of the rule that jurisdiction over individuals rests on physical power must have been uncertain at best in the minds of the legislators of these fourteen states.
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In 1945, Mr. Justice Stone speaking for the court in the International Shoe case critically re-examined the fictional approaches upon which the validity for the substituted service statutes rested and formulated a new approach:
"Now that capias ad respondenum has given .way to personal service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that, in order to subject a defendant to a judgment personam, if he be not present within the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' ",23
Given, then, a sufficiency of "minimum contacts" by the nonresident with the state, this "substantial justice" theory considers it "fair play" to render the nonresident amenable to local suit In another case the use of an airport by the nonresident corporation's airplane was held to constitute enough contact under the minimum contacts test to validate substituted service of process on the corporation. [Italics added.] While the court admitted that the acts of solicitation of the defendant would not amount to "doing business," they were sufficient to make him amenable to local suit under the statute. The same doctrines would seem equally applicable, under appropriate statute, to nonresident individuals having such minimum contacts.
Courts have not as yet substantially expanded the "doing business" basis of jurisdiction, being restricted by the wording of the state statute and the gloss which the term has acquired. 40 However, it was the broad interpretation of the local statute phrased in terms of "doing business" that led to the Supreme Court decision in the International Shoe case. The lone solicitation case 41 involving a nonresident individual to arise subsequent to the decision in the International Shoe case suggests that the nonresident was not engaged in business within the state by merely soliciting contracts of entertainment at schools; although another explanation is that the person served was not sufficiently an "agent."
It remains for the legislatures of the states to take advantage of their expanded constitutional power to determine what acts will subject the defendant to local suit. A statute has been suggested eliminating the ambiguous term, "doing business," and which would permit local suit: "For any and all actions, suits, demands, or claims in law or equity, either at common law, or under appropriate statute arising out of the commission of the tort, or making or breach of the contracted obligation.' '42
In conclusion, the International Shoe case affords a basis for the expansion of local suits against the nonresident individuals in three directions:
(1) It impliedly overrules Flexner v. Parson.
(2) It offers a basis for upholding a state statute defining the acts of the nonresident not as the traditional "doing business," but more broadly, as categories amounting to "minimum contacts" -with the local state. (3) It may lead the court, without help from the legislature, to modify their doing business requirement so as to include those acts amounting to "minimum contacts" with the forum.
